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ДЖИХАДИСТСКАЯ ПРОПАГАНДА В ИНТЕРНЕТЕ И СОЦИАЛЬНЫХ МЕДИА

АННОТАЦИЯ. Настоящая статья посвящена исследованию коммуникативных стратегий, используемых в пропаганде двух основных джихадистских организаций — «Аль-Каиды» и «Исламского государства Ирака и Леванта» (в альтернативном переводе «Исламского государства Ирака и Сирии»). Как показывает практика, агитация, осуществляемая данными террористическими организациями, позволила значительно расширить их идеологическое влияние в мире. С одной стороны, пропаганда «Аль-Каиды» и ИГИЛ играет значимую роль в вербовке боевиков со всего мира для участия в боевых действиях в Ираке и Сирии, с другой — поощряет сторонников пропагандируемой идеологии осуществлять террористические акты на Западе.

Анализ пропаганды «Аль-Каиды» показывает, что дискурс данной организации опирается на ограниченный набор средств убеждения — литургическую проповедь и традиционную арабскую риторику. Пропаганда ИГИЛ характеризуется использованием новых техник пропаганды: традиционные литургические выступления на арабском языке, адресованные посетителям мечетей, сочетаются с современными формами коммуникации, такими как радио, телевидение, социальные медиа, в том числе передовое программное обеспечение, высококачественные изображения, графика и видео. Более того, исследование джихадистской пропаганды обнаруживает идеологическую конкуренцию между «Аль-Каидой» и ИГИЛ, пытающихся воздействовать на эмоциональную сферу адресата и привлечь сторонников.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: ИГИЛ; ислам; джихадизм; риторика; коммуникация.

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Introduction

Growing threats and worldwide influences of jihadist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or al-Qaeda rely on ideological, military, financial and operational capacities. However, radical Islamist groups could not succeed without appropriate propaganda and communication strategies that enabled to recruit and inspire insurgents, including foreign volunteers.

Al-Qaeda was the first organization, which exploited effectively media agitations, which concentrated on audiovisual manifestos broadcasted by Arab satellite channels and Internet websites. The manifestos had limited technical facilities and they relied on traditional communication forms in the Arab world.

In recent times, agitation campaigns have been initiated by ISIS, which focuses on new technologies and social media. In fact, the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and other Al-Qaida's leaders like Anwar Awlaki or Abu Yahia al-Libi, as well as eruption of the Arab Spring have affected al-Qaeda's ideological and operational capacities. Moreover, failures of the transition process in post-revolutionary countries and overthrow of Islamist representatives by secular and military forces deepened the crisis among al-Qaeda's militants who expected other results and they hoped to share power or to implement their ideological programs.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS responded to insurgents' hopes and offered new concept of jihad and implementation of sharia regulations as well as establishment of the historic caliphate. Successful military com-

bats, support of Sunni communities, control of large parts of Syria and Iraq as well as terror campaign and brutal executions reinforced the position of the organization and defined new forms of jihad compared to dignity, bravery, honor and adventure. So far, more than 30 different groups, including insurgents from Asia and Africa have taken an oath to al-Baghdadi [Feakin, Wilkinson 2015: 7-8].

Moreover, al-Qaeda and ISIS compete each other for successful position among worldwide jihadists. The last terrorist attacks in Paris demonstrate this phenomenon. The attack against French Charlie Hebdo magazine in January 2015 was carried out by the Kouachi brothers who were inspired by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Besides, Amedy Coulibaly, who headed the attack against the kosher supermarket in Paris claimed that he was encouraged by ISIS [Callimachi, Yardley 2015].

Propaganda techniques played a crucial role in motivation and agitation process that encouraged young persons to carry out brutal acts against civilians in France. Similar situation reflect other recruits who are inspired by appropriate forms or messages presented in the Internet and social media. In this regard, the jihadist propaganda deserves further studied.

Traditional concept of jihadist propaganda

First forms of jihadist propaganda were rather limited and they concerned al-Qaeda organization, which focused on verbal and written manifestos. Audiovisual or stylistic features were limited and less important because al-

Qaeda's leaders such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri or Musab al-Zarqawi usually delivered their manifestos in difficult logistic conditions in war zones of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Propaganda materials delivered by official Islamist websites or TV channels like al-Jazeera contained poor scenery, staid graphics and uniform pictures highlighting figures of the speaker. Moreover, after each terrorist attack insurgents and followers have waited an official statement of al-Qaeda's command and they have respected all ideas, slogans and objectives of the message.

However, propaganda techniques applied in official manifestos exploited the concept of liturgical sermons called *khutba* and Arabic rhetoric called *balagha*. *Khutba* is one of the oldest narrative and oratory forms in the Arab and Muslim world. It is presented in mosques during Friday's prayer or on special occasions of feasts and holidays. Basic narration and stylistic features reflect two parts of the speech. The first one regards short prayers, religious invocations and citations of Quranic verses. It is always followed by the expression: *wa ba'd* (and then; afterwards), which indicates separation between passages in the speech. The second part is delivered after a short break and it is the main fragment of the sermon. It usually concerns religious and moral values or social questions such as unemployment, drug abuse, organized crime or family crisis and positive values of Islam. Discussions are based on the Quran and hadiths (stories, statements and report attributed to the Prophet Mohammad) or various allegories and examples from history and everyday life. The speech is concluded by other religious citations [Jones 2012: 195—232].

Moreover, the central fragment of the sermon also reflect implementation of rhetorical devices regarding different forms of narration and compositions, appropriate words and arguments as well as rhetorical figures like comparisons, metaphors, repetitions or antithesis [Gaffney 2012: 271-293].

Khutba also includes some non-verbal devices and speaker's attributes such as theological skills, respect among believers, presentation of the sermon in liturgical podium above the auditorium as well as sacral clothes during the speech or balanced voice and gestures [Jones 2012: 195—232].

It should be pointed out that religious discourse was often politicized by Islamist groups, which used the structure of *khutba* or *balagha* to present political messages in the second part of the speech. Examples presented in the following paper are based on jihadist propaganda materials available in private archives of the author. They were collected from various ji-

hadist websites, social media as well as al-Jazeera Internet sections that published al-Qaeda manifestos in 2001-2011. Al-Jazeera finally cancelled navigation to the section.

For instance, al-Qaeda's leaders Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri often started their speeches with religious invocations such as: "In the name of God the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful", "Prayer and peace be upon the Prophet", "Peace be upon those who follow the right way," or: "I seek protection in Allah from the accursed Satan." After the expression: *wa ba'd* they concentrated on the second part, which was a combination of political, ideological and religious slogans and demands.

Al-Qaeda's publications and media presentations were focusing on two opposite images. The first was based on criticism, accusations and damnations of different political enemies like Western governments and military forces as well as local authorities and officials. The second idea reflected glorification of terrorist activities and encouragement of supporters and militants.

However, those images were based on different rhetorical devices, which had a strong influence on emotions and opinions of the audience. Al-Qaeda's leaders often used particular names and definitions attributed to Western enemies, interior authorities and military forces. For example, many words focused on historical and religious symbols. The publications often contained the words like *salibiyyun* (crusaders), *sihyuniyyun* (Zionists) and *taghut* (a devil, a Satan). The enemies and opponents were also called *kuffar* (sinners), *murtaddun* (apostates) or *a'da Allah ta'ala* (The enemies of Allah). Al-Qaeda's leaders tried to keep alive national and social disproportions as well as religious dissensions between societies in the world. They adopted words containing negative connotations related to a sin, a devil, immorality and hostility as well as critical impressions resulting from crusaders war and Zionism. Moreover, political messages were intensified by certain Quranic verses and *hadith*, which explained objectives of jihadism and justified terrorist activities.

Manifestos also concerned traumatic descriptions regarding Muslim communities in particular countries. Many manifestos referred to Western military operations and devastations among civilians in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia or Chechnya. The arguments affected feelings and reactions of Muslim societies who condoled with victims of military missions in the Arab-Muslim world.

The negative opinions about Western countries were also emphasized by distinctive and controversial news frustrating or shocking the

public opinion. Jihadist groups benefited from events, which demonstrated humiliation or insults to traditions, beliefs and costumes of Muslim communities around the world. Statements have also mentioned tortures of prisoners in Guantanamo and Abou Ghraib, as well as caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad or a ban of Islamic veil in Europe.

The appeal to different arguments were usually followed by final conclusions showing a new kind of crusades against Islam, which encouraged additionally to military and terrorist response.

Besides, appropriate arguments glorified militants responsible for the spectacular terrorist plots like the 9/11 attacks or Madrid bombings in 2004 and London attacks in 2005. Al-Qaeda's militants were exalted by metaphoric expressions concerning destruction of the pagan idol, which replaced the literary sense of the 9/11 attacks. The terrorist acts were justified and respected because they generated religious connotations related to struggle against the evil and paganism. Moreover, al-Qaeda referred to glorious events in the Arab-Islamic history and descriptions of distinguished Muslim personalities or heroes like successors of the Prophet Mohammad, famous caliphs or brave military leaders.

Traditional liturgical discourse has affected ISIS's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who applied the concept of the sermon in his official speeches. The sermon delivered in Ramadan 2014, in which he announced the establishment of the caliphate is a good example in that context [Strange 2014]. Contrary to previous jihadist leaders, al-Baghdadi respected all conventions and etiquettes regarding non-verbal and narration features of *khutba* [Jones 2012: 195—232]. His sermon was presented in classic Arabic in the main mosque in Mosul above the auditorium in liturgical podium. Al-Baghdadi was wearing sacral clothes and he was standing up at the first step of speech and then he was sitting down during other parts of the discourse. He also avoided loud voices, chaotic gestures or reactions and he used index fingers to precise or underlines some questions.

Apart from personal skills, al-Baghdadi followed strict narration and stylistic devices of *khutba* and *balagha*. He started his speech with religious invocations and citations and after a short break he refers to main subjects concerning spiritual values of the holy month, which absolves from all sins and rehabilitates human souls. Ramadan was confronted with specific concept of jihad described by al-Baghdadi as scarified efforts facilitating defeat of enemies and implementation of Islam values and the historic caliphate.

Furthermore, Al-Baghdadi's opinions were followed by appropriate argumentations based on sources such as the Quran, hadiths or citations of noble personalities from the history of Muslim empires. For examples, he refers to the speech of the Caliph Abu Bakr who became the first Muslim Caliph from 632 to 634 following the Prophet Muhammad's death. Al-Baghdadi appeals to the famous speech of Abu Bakr after seizure of power: "I have been given the authority over you, and I am not the best of you. If I do well, help me; and if I do wrong, set me right. Sincere regard for truth is loyalty and disregard for truth is treachery. The weak amongst you shall be strong with me until I have secured his rights, if God will; and the strong amongst you shall be weak with me until I have wrested from him the rights of others, if God will. Obey me so long as I obey God and His Messenger. But if I disobey God and His Messenger, ye owe me no obedience. Arise for your prayer, God have mercy upon you" [Munir 2005: 39—40].

Al-Baghdadi stated his obedience to Allah's orders like the first caliph Abu Bakr did. He also avoided straight political messages but the appeal to the symbolic speech of Abu Bakr enabled to authorize the new Caliphate, distinguish the power of the new Muslim leader and stimulate allegiance of other jihadist groups. However, the narration of the speech and liturgical style also explained and justified ISIS's policy regarding violent implementation of sharia laws, executions of hostages and rival religious factions.

Al-Qaeda's media and Internet facilities

Al-Qaeda propaganda techniques have flourished along with development of new technologies and Internet facilities. The organization expanded its activities in particular websites such as *Ansar al-mujahidun* (Supporters of mujahideen), *Shabakat al-jihad al-alamiiyyi* (Network of Global Jihad), *Shabakat ash-shumukh al-islamiyya* (Islamic Glory Network). The websites often changed their names and technical parameters because of Internet blockade and suspension.

The Internet services included various materials produced by media centers like as *as-Sahab* (Cloud) that focused on global issues as well as local services like *Furqan* (Victory) and *al-Fajr* (Dawn) from Iraq or *Kataib* (Battalion) from Somalia, *al-Andalus* (Andalusia) from Maghreb and *al-Malahim* (Epics) from the Gulf. Al-Qaeda's online offensive was determined by growing number of audiovisual materials. For instance, in 2007 *as-Sahab* network released 97 different media productions comparing to 2002 when the organization issued only 6 videos [Whitlock 2008]. The concept of media cam-

paigā relied on decentralized networks, which posted online materials that usually concerned video reports from battlefields in the Middle East, Asia or north Africa. Statements of regional insurgents were identified by the same composition of texts, which pointed out detailed descriptions of terrorist attacks. All materials stressed dates and way of terrorist attacks as well as information about damages and casualties among security forces and civilian (Manifestos of regional jihadist groups were often published by particular websites such as al-Boraq). Besides, local statements became a derivation of the manifestos delivered by al-Qaeda's leaders. For instance, regional insurgents used the same meanings describing different enemies called apostates, pagans or crusaders and they applied similar arguments justifying and glorifying terrorist attacks.

Moreover, regional statements were reinforced by some video materials. Distinctive features of the productions reflected dynamic scenes and combination of different motifs. Many videos started with presentations of al-Qaeda's leaders, who delivered their speeches in front of pictures pointing out spectacular terrorist attacks like September 11 attacks, Madrid bombings in 2004 or London attacks in 2005. The manifestos were interfered with official press releases and videos showing military activities of Al-Qaeda. However, the scenes were supported by religious chants glorifying fighters and condemning enemies, as well as pictures demonstrating tragic situation of Muslim communities around the world.

Pictures of al-Qaeda's leaders were confronted with videos of local branches that demonstrated in details attacks against local authorities, US army patrols, convoys and official headquarters. The scenes usually showed trapped cars, which exploded in front of military vehicles or governmental buildings. Besides, some reports described every step of the attack. First scenes were called *Idad al-ghazwa* (Preparation of the attack) and they presented preparations of explosives and the trapped car. The scenes were followed by sequences showing greetings and wishes between fighters and their commandants. Afterwards, the videos focused on travel through the target called *Rihla* (Journey). Last scenes highlighted strong detonation of explosives placed in cars or trucks. Sometimes, the final scenes were repeated and slowed down to point out the moment of the destruction. All films included appropriate battle songs encouraging the audience to support al-Qaeda's activities. The chants contained burdens like: "The fate to the target has started" or: "Dear Mather! Pass the racket Katyusha and put on the back a uniform of cartridge". The

phrases conserved their rhymes and they expressed poetic, pathetic or sentimental character of the battle compared to heroism, dignity and adventures.

Furthermore, encouragements and glorifications of terrorist attacks were also based on pictures illustrating pride, glory and happiness of death fighters. Many videos scenes included pictures of smiling and happy faces of combatants after the attack, as well as inscriptions: "After the sacrifice, an aroma of musk has risen from his body". The authors of films adopted magic and spiritual elements to terrorist acts that affected sentiments and emotions of insurgents, who considered terror actions as heroic deeds.

New forms of jihadist propaganda

Counter-terrorism campaigns have decreased the role of al-Qaeda's official websites that were censored, blocked and suspended. Webmasters had limited access to Internet services and militants were forced to use suitable passwords and logins.

ISIS took a lesson from the situation and implemented some innovative forms of propaganda that includes new technologies such as TV channels, radio stations or social media and sophisticated online magazines issued in PDF versions. It should be pointed out that all sources are available in different free Web hosting or uploading sites. They are released in multilingual versions in order to attract wide audience, especially young militants from Western countries [Daninos 2015: 10-14].

Dabiq magazine became an important communication platform for radical Islamists around the world. The name refers to the historic Battle of Marj Dabiq near Aleppo in Syria. In 1516 the Ottoman army conquered most of the Middle East, which encompassed the entire region of Syria and built the new Empire [Gray 1975: 14-15]. Instead of long theological and political discussions, the magazine contains short messages based on suggestive graphics and provocative pictures similar to tabloid press or comics. Cover and first pages from the magazine usually present main headlines, including slogans regarding policy and strategy of the new caliphate. Statements, manifestos and short reports are always followed by photos illustrating ISIS successful offensives and campaigns in Syria and Iraq, images of wounded soldiers among fires and explosions as well as victorious parades of militants in controlled cities or harvest campaign and distribution of food and water. Other pictures show brutal executions of Shia prisoners, representatives of Christian and Yazidi communities or some colorful and sophisticated graphics showing spectacular terrorist

attacks around the world. The pictures are followed by symbolic sentences such as: "Khalifa declared", "A new era has arrived" or: "It's either the Islamic state of the flood".

The *Dabiq* respects traditional concept of propaganda popularized by previous jihadist leaders such as Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For example, different opponents are usually called *salibiyyun* (crusaders), *taghut* (a devil, a Satan) or *kuffar* (sinners) and *murtaddun* (apostates). The meanings are already known for radical Islamists, who compare Western and local authorities to the Devil, sins, immorality, crusaders wars or Zionism. Furthermore, the *Dabiq* presents transliterations of the Arabic words without English equivalents in order to conserve stylistic traditions of jihadist propaganda and to identify symbolic meanings that unite and strengthen ISIS insurgents and followers. It should be also pointed out, that ISIS hijacked the stylistic and linguistic concept of the *Inspire* magazine issued by Anwar al-Awlaqi who has been killed in 2011 by drone attack on his convoy in Jawf province, Yemen [Koplowitz 2013]. Sophisticated and modern style of the *Inspire* magazine contained short messages in English based on suggestive graphics and significant pictures similar to tabloid press or comics and graffiti. The slogans exposed in the journals usually refer to martyrdom and bravery of militants as well as destructive activities of Western countries.

Apart from online journals and magazines ISIS broadcasts the radio station called *al-Bayan* (Statement) and TV station al-Hayat Media Center as well as the Internet service *A'maq Ikhbariyya* (Depth of Information). The audiovisual tools enable to implement sophisticated programs and headlines, including high quality pictures, graphics and videos regarding statements on terrorist attacks, short multilingual reports from battlefields in Syria and Iraq, brutal executions of hostages as well as manifestos glorifying attacks against enemies and implementation of ISIS laws and regulation in controlled territories [Ajroudi 2015]. For example, some media sources present modifications of heroes and graphics appearing in popular video games or Hollywood films. They are attributed to local fighters who are compared in that way to brave and famous heroes fighting with brutal enemies.

Statements released by ISIS media stations are often similar to the war reports published by al-Qaeda in the past. They usually contain dates and type of attacks as well as number of casualties among security forces and civilians. However, descriptions and updates are always followed by appropriate graphics, pictures, color scheme and logos that identify the organization.

ISIS also exploits social media such as Twitter. Militants usually avoid Facebook or Instagram profiles because in their opinions they have poor security and encrypting tools. Besides, new encrypting programs and application become more and more popular among jihadists who try to protect their identity and conversations [Zetter 2015]. However, ISIS is still very active in Twitter that facilitates fast communication and publication of short messages, graphics and videos. ISIS's profiles contain appropriate avatars that identify users, their political views and character of displayed materials. Every tweet generates other posts and profiles reflecting common ideas of jihadism, glorification of fighters and condemnation of local and Western authorities or threats of future attacks. Twitter profiles also regard unofficial services of Hayat Media Center or *A'maq Ikhbariyya* as well as less known accounts services like *Somood* from Afghanistan or *Qabas* and *Rimah*, which focus on ISIS policy in the world or Syrian and Iraqi territories.

Furthermore, ISIS militants can freely express their opinions, manifestos, graphics and videos. The new phenomenon was obvious during the terrorist attack against the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris in January 2015. ISIS's followers published a tragic photo of a dead policemen lying on the ground. It should be noted that first videos from the attack showed a terrorist shooting a police officer who tried to help people executed in the editorial board of the Charlie Hebdo. Twitter accounts used by ISIS released the picture of the killed policeman with short inscriptions: "If we do not revenge the Prophet, we do not will know prosperity" and: "The attack against the newspaper which published pictures insulting the Prophet" ([www.twitter.com/ss20y4_zz/status/5529008774030454784](https://twitter.com/ss20y4_zz/status/5529008774030454784) (accessed 20.01.2015)). The commentaries explained and justified the attacks and they glorified ISIS's policy.

Blocking of Twitter accounts are ineffective because suspended profiles are replaced by new users who often change their avatars and names. According to the United States Department of Defense there are around 6000 active ISIS users. Some surveys estimate 46 000 ISIS's supporters who use Twitter accounts [White Paper 2015: 11-13]. It is also more and more difficult to identify potential supporters, militants and terrorists because they use various avatars, profiles, symbols and particular words that unite them and facilitate communication and exchange of materials. It should be pointed out that communication between jihadists relies on appropriate words and phrases in Arabic. They identify internet accounts and hashtags in Twitter service. Internet

users usually refer to Arabic hashtags like: *khilafa* (caliphate) and *dawla islamiyya* (Islamic State), *jund al-khilafa* (soldiers of the caliphate) or *shabakat al-jihad al-alamiiyyi* (worldwide jihadi network), *a'maq ikhbaryyya* and *ansar al-mujahidin* (followers of mujahideens) that are a derivation of popular jihadist websites. The words are often modified and they include additional epithets in Arabic in case of blocking and suspension. Many Tweeter accounts also reflect different statements, threats and short commentaries posted after particular terrorist attacks. The accounts are usually attributed to the hashtag *ghazwa mubarak* (blessed invasion) with an appropriate name of the country affected by terrorist threats and attacks.

Conclusions

The research presented in the paper has demonstrated some communication and propaganda strategies of the main jihadist groups al-Qaeda and ISIS. Analysis of propaganda techniques showed that al-Qaeda's media campaigns have concentrated on limited technical facilities and written manifestos based on liturgical sermon and Arabic rhetoric. Moreover, in recent times al-Qaeda has decreased its propaganda capacities because of censorship and suspension of official websites. The agitation process was replaced by successful ideological and military offensives of ISIS that spread different sorts of agitation techniques, especially in social media such as Twitter.

Besides, studies on jihadist propaganda presented some common propaganda mechanisms applied by al-Qaeda and ISIS. In fact, al-Qaeda has inspired ISIS's militants who applied similar propaganda materials. Both organizations have delivered liturgical speeches and adopted rhetorical features in their sermons. On the other, al-Baghdadi's sermons had more effective impacts on the audience that appreciated adherence to the stylistic principles of the sermon and ideological or theological messages.

Besides, both organizations released similar statements compared to war reports that have included appropriate graphics, narration and stylistic or rhetorical figures as well as similar descriptions of terrorist attacks and information about damages and causalities. This phenomenon also reflected the *Dabiq* magazine published by ISIS and the *Inspire* magazine issued by Anwar al-Awlaki from al-Qaeda. In this regard, both organizations have been operating like a well-coordinated enterprise with particular logos, appropriate graphics or color schemes.

However, contrary to al-Qaeda's media campaigns, ISIS reinforced various channels of

communications and exploited new technologies and Internet facilities. For instance, activities in social media have expanded ideological and operational influences of ISIS and encouraged different militants in the world to join al-Baghdadi's organization. Various Internet accounts and Tweeter profiles have enabled to express jihadist objectives and to spread extremist ideas among internet users in order to recruit new fighters and to inspire terrorist attacks.

The research presented in the paper also showed some new challenges for security and counterterrorism policies in the world. It should be pointed out that it is more and more difficult to identify potential supporters, militants and terrorists because they use various avatars, profiles, symbols and particular Arabic hashtags that unite them and facilitate communication and exchange of materials. Besides, blocking of Twitter accounts are ineffective because suspended profiles are replaced by new users who often change their avatars and profiles.

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JIHADIST PROPAGANDA IN THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA

ABSTRACT. *The present paper concerns studies on communication and propaganda strategies of the main jihadist groups al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In fact, agitation campaigns implemented by those organizations enabled to expand ideological and operational influences as well as to encourage different militants in the world to join the battlefield in Syria and Iraq or to carry out terrorist attacks in the West.*

Analysis of propaganda techniques reflects al-Qaeda propaganda, which concentrates on limited technical facilities and written manifestos based on liturgical sermon and Arabic rhetoric.

Besides, the research presents some innovative propaganda techniques implemented by ISIS. They combine traditional, liturgical speeches in Arabic addressed to local audiences in mosques and modern forms of communication such as radio and TV stations, social media including sophisticated programs, high quality pictures, graphics and videos. Moreover, studies on jihadist propaganda show specific ideological competitions between al-Qaeda and ISIS, which try to attract the audience and affect emotions of followers who support particular group.

KEYWORDS: ISIS; Islam; jihadism; rhetoric; communication.

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